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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In this essay, Benoît Pelopidas outlines what is known about French NC3 and identifies 
discursive, sociological and temporal challenges to assessing the validity of claims on this 
topic. After reviewing the primacy of presidential nuclear authority, the nuclear chain of 
command, civilian control over the arsenal, tension between legitimacy and robustness of the 
chain of command, the role of military authority in the launch order, inadequate code transfer, 
and accidents and close calls, he concludes: “Beyond the problems of arbitrariness, 
mismanagement, incidents and accidents outlined above, there are key components of the 
French nuclear command and control system about which we either do not know much or 
have partial and conflicting accounts.” 
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Summary 
This paper engages with French nuclear command, control and communications, or NC3. It 
first lays out the situation of knowledge about French nuclear history and identifies three 
challenges to assessing the validity of claims on this topic: a discursive, a sociological and a 
temporal challenge. Therefore, it is composed of two sections: the first one offers the official 
rationale for the French NC3 system, its structure, and its performance while the second offers 
a critical assessment of the limits of validity of such claims. It is based on all the available open 
source literature in French and English on the topic and is based on elite interviews as well as 
archival research, and on a rigorous use of social scientific methods to keep the conditions of 
validity of such claims in focus at every point of the analysis.  
 
1. Introduction: The challenges of getting to know about French command-and-control 
procedures and practices1 
It is well established that command-and-control practices are highly classified and most 
discourse about them comes from the executive branch or the presidency of nuclear weapon 
states. Given that historical research has shown that the centralization of the ability to use 
nuclear weapons has been overstated in several instances,2 any further investigation of the 
matter should start with a careful assessment of the conditions of production of the available 
information on nuclear weapons command and control and the limits of its validity. This will 
be the main purpose of the introductory section of this paper. 
Indeed, the situation and modes of knowledge production in the other two NATO nuclear 
weapon states, the US and the UK, is likely to give a misleading picture of available knowledge 
regarding French command-and-control practices and procedures. In those two countries, an 
increasing amount of information has become publicly available over time.3 This is true for 
mostly two reasons. First, processes do exist which allow citizens and researchers to request 
the declassification of documents in the name of a right to know. Second, NGOs and reputable 
independent scholars have investigated nuclear weapons issues for a long time and have 
developed methods allowing them to check and triangulate the validity of claims made by 
                                                             
1 In text references about French NC3 can be found in full in the bibliography at the end of this paper. Other 
references not directly related to French NC3 will be indicated in full in footnotes. My warmest thanks go to the 
NK team, Peter Hayes and Steve Freedkin and in particular to Nari Shelekpayev and Roxana Vermel for making 
this paper better than it would have been. 
2 For instance, in 1964, candidate Lyndon B. Johnson campaigned on the fact that his political opponent could not 
be trusted with nuclear weapons and insisted on the fact that he would have sole authority on launching the 
weapons while he was organizing the delegation of such authority. See Bruce G. Blair The Logic of Accidental 
Nuclear War (Washington D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1993) ; Daniel Ellsberg, The Doomsday Machine. 
Confessions of a nuclear war planner, New York, Bloomsbury, 2017, p. 15-16. 
3 In the UK, information came from the documentary The Human Button released on the BBC in December 2008. 
government officials or members of the weapons production facilities. Neither of those 
conditions applies to the French context. No Freedom of Information Act exists in French law. 
On the contrary, since February 2008, a law intended to prevent the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons allows the government to maintain the classification of documents, including any 
information relevant to the production and handling of such weapons, in perpetuity.4 Scholarly 
writing about nuclear weapons related issues is very limited and has been dependent on the 
official discourse on the subject until the creation of the Nuclear Knowledges program in 2017 
so that checking the validity of the available discourse on the topic was very challenging.5 While 
good work of diplomatic history was conducted, it illustrates the limits of this particular practice 
and the concessions associated with the efforts at writing the first wave of historiography. 
Access to elite participants was a priority. Ability to check the accuracy and completeness of 
their claims because of lack of independent access to primary documentation was almost absent. 
As a result, the existing account of French nuclear history, most of which dates back to the 
1980s and 1990s, revolves around a state-centric narrative of rational policymaking conducted 
by leaders who gave their testimony. A second wave of historiography engaging more critically 
with bureaucratic politics and shedding light on the inconsistencies that have been identified in 
all other nuclear weapons programs is still in the making.6 Over the last twenty years, nuclear 
weapons related writings have been monopolized by experts coming from think tanks heavily 
dependent on state and industry funding; and most recently, nuclear weapons officials have 
been actively engaged in renarrating French nuclear history and introducing this official, 
uncritical and biased narrative in universities (Roche 2017; Mongin and Jurgensen 2018). This 
situation largely accounts for why core questions about command and control, overconfidence 
in the controllability of nuclear crises, the inconsistencies between Presidential speeches, the 
doctrine, the targeting policy and the arsenal, as well as the credibility of the French posture 
over time, have not been asked in any depth in academic circles.   
As a consequence of the problem of access, there is a problem of limits of validity of claims 
related to the degree of perfection of nuclear control practices (adequate information processing 
and transfer, operational technology, perfectly compliant personnel who do not make any 
mistakes) for three reasons: a discursive reason that has to do with the dual goal of claims on 
those issues, a sociological reason associated with the professional and patriotic duties of the 
sources, and a temporal reason making it more difficult to assess the independence of sources 
with regards to each other.  
Discursively first, claims about nuclear weapons command and control serve two purposes, 
which are in tension with each other. On the one hand, the claims about command and control 
practices are analytical and descriptive: they are expected to tell how and how well the systems 
work. To achieve this goal, they should be accurate and complete. On the other hand, such 
                                                             
4 Sébastien-Yves Laurent, Le secret de l’Etat. Paris: archives nationales, 2015, p. 153. 
5 Detailed evidence of how expert nuclear discourse in France shares most assumptions of French official nuclear 
weapons policy can be found in Benoît Pelopidas, “Sortir du panglossisme nucléaire” [beyond nuclear 
panglossism], Thomas Meszaros (éd.), Les stratégies nucléaires. Ruptures et continuités. Bern, Peter Lang, 
forthcoming. 
6 Beatrice Heuser, Nuclear Mentalities. Strategies and beliefs in Britain, France and the FRG, London, Palgrave 
McMillan, 1998 chap. 5; Benoît Pelopidas, “The unbearable lightness of luck. Three sources of overconfidence in 
the controllability of nuclear crises” European Journal of International Security 2:2, July 2017: 240-262; Florent 
Pouponneau, La politique française de non-prolifération nucléaire. De la division du travail 
diplomatique, Bruxelles, Peter Lang, 2015 [French nuclear non-proliferation policy]. 
claims are obviously and admittedly performative. They are aimed at several audiences to 
convince them that the system works perfectly so they should both believe the credibility of the 
pledge of nuclear retaliation and not fear accidental explosions, escalation, or a splendid nuclear 
first strike caused by a breach in the command and control protocol. Once those two goals are 
clarified, it becomes clear the performative goal of claims about nuclear command and control 
practices considerably limits what can be said about its flaws, weaknesses, and past instances 
of failures and mismanagement. This is most obviously true of any information channel that 
can be reached by a potential adversary. As a result, we as analysts should expect possible 
accuracy of such claims but certainly not their completeness. 
While the two goals in tension of claims about command and control explored above prevents 
completeness, the sociological origins of such claims create a possible duty to hide or mislead 
on the part of the sources. In other words, information can only be gathered from individuals 
who have pledged, for professional and/or patriotic reasons, to serve institutions which have an 
interest in not displaying the limits and weaknesses of the national nuclear weapons 
infrastructure.7 There is a professional or patriotic duty to hide or mislead as giving an accurate 
and complete picture of the situation, assuming that one single actor has it, would go against 
the institution’s reputation and the perceived requirements of nuclear deterrence. In the best 
case scenario, claims will be sincere about their limits but this sincerity will be difficult to 
assess. 
Third, as time passes and nuclear secrecy is maintained, a third, temporal difficulty appears, 
which has to do with a difficulty to check the independence of the additional sources one finds 
to make sure they do not result in an undue self-confirming bubble. The scarcity of sources 
makes it more likely that available testimonies are less independent from each other than they 
claim to be and the passage of time may remove the first layer of sources, which is where one 
would see how few they were. As time passes and publications multiply, it becomes less and 
less visible that they all depend on this single and, as such, unverified, account. A famous 
precedent is the narrative of Soviet fear of NATO surprise attack which has been presented as 
a point of consensus among scholars over the last decade but most accounts of which can be 
traced back to the testimony of KGB defector Oleg Gordievsky.8  
Therefore, the discursive characteristics of claims about nuclear command and control as well 
as their sociological origins and the methodological challenges of continued nuclear secrecy 
and scarcity of sources make completeness impossible and accuracy harder to assess than in 
any other realm. 
This is why this paper will be divided in two parts: the official statements about the organization 
and performance of French nuclear command and control systems first, and then a critical 
assessment of the imperfections, contradictions and incompleteness of this picture using 
rigorous social science methods. It engages French NC3 and leaves aside most practices of 
nuclear weapons policymaking which are not directly related to it. It is based on publicly 
available information, archival research in the debates at the French national assembly and 
interviews with high-level officials in the French nuclear weapons complex, with full awareness 
                                                             
7 This tension is explored in full in Benoît Pelopidas, Nuclear weapons scholarship as a case of self-censorship in 
security studies”, Journal of Global Security Studies 1(4), November 2016 and “Sortir du panglossisme nucléaire”. 
8 See Simon Miles, ‘The war scare that wasn’t. Able Archer and the myths of the Second Cold War’, paper 
presented at the Nuclear Knowledges workshop on nuclear close calls, Paris, November 16, 2018.  
that the accuracy of the claims is much more likely than their completeness, given the problems 
exposed above.  
 
2. The official rationale for the French chain of command: the nuclear monarchy9 
The Primacy of the President  
The official narrative of French nuclear history is built around a core rationale of non-delegation 
of the authority to launch the French nuclear arsenal beyond the President of the Republic.10 
The nickname of the “nuclear monarchy”11 , originally meant to be critical when it appeared in 
the 1970s but quickly appropriated by the power in charge of the arsenal, offers a good 
illustration.  
This common focus on the head of state is grounded in the French Constitution and two decrees 
from 1964 and 1996. Article 5 of the Constitution establishes the president as the guarantor of 
‘national independence’ and ‘territorial integrity’ of France, two commonly stated justifications 
for the French nuclear arsenal. Article 15 establishes the president as the ‘Commander-in-Chief 
of the Armed Forces’ who presides over ‘the higher national defence councils and committees’. 
The 1964 decree gave the president legal authority as the head of the armed forces to engage 
French strategic air forces which were, at the time, the only ones carrying nuclear warheads.12 
This was extensively interpreted as establishing Presidential authority over the use of any 
French nuclear weapons but this extended authority was only formalized in a June 1996 decree, 
which elevated the presidential authority over nuclear matters, a decision which requires the 
President’s signature to be reversed.13 Two institutions illustrate the President’s primacy in 
terms of decision-making related to nuclear weapons use: the President’s Etat-major particulier 
[private military staff], the existence of which is not established in any decree14 and the defense 
council that later became the Defence and National Security Council. (Tertrais and Guisnel 
2016: 165, 235, 237, 238, 250) 
 
Three people in the nuclear chain of command: The President, the CEMA and the CEMP 
A decision to engage French nuclear forces has to involve three personalities: the President, the 
Chef d’Etat-major des Armées (CEMA, the equivalent of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff in its supervision over the French army, navy and air force) and his Chef d’Etat-major 
Particulier (CEMP, Private chief of staff). (Tertrais 2010: 112-113; Tertrais and Guisnel 2016: 
                                                             
9 This section owes a lot to Tertrais 2010. 
10 Bernard Chantebout, « La dissuasion nucléaire et le pouvoir présidentiel » [Nuclear deterrence and executive 
power], Pouvoirs, no. 38 (1986), pp. 21–32 ; Scilla McLean (ed.), in the name of the Oxford Research Group, How 
nuclear decisions are made, London: Palgrave 1986, p. 179. 
11 Samy Cohen, La monarchie nucléaire. Les coulisses de la politique étrangère sous la cinquième République. 
Paris: Hachette, 1986; Beatrice Heuser, Nuclear Mentalities. Strategies and beliefs in Britain, France and the 
FRG, London, Palgrave McMillan, 1998 chap. 5. 
12 Décret no. 64-46 du 14 janvier 1964 relatif aux forces aériennes stratégiques [Decree no. 64-46 of 14 January 
1964 relating to the strategic air forces].  
13 Décret no. 96-520 du 12 juin 1996 portant détermination des responsabilités concernant les forces nucléaires 
[Decree no. 96-520 of 12 June 1996 on the determination of responsibilities related to nuclear forces]. 
14  It is composed of four generals plus staff, including most importantly the President’s Chef d’état major 
particulier, [Private chief of staff, CEMP] 
246-250; Tertrais and Lewis 2019: 17). The three representations we have of this chain of 
command are consistent.  
The President would initiate the engagement order most likely from the Jupiter command post 
situated under the Elysée Palace (Giscard d’Estaing 1991: 205). If the President is away, s/he 
would use the light and mobile command post that is supposed to follow him at all time, the PC 
léger déplaçable PCLD. It is clear that this command center has been remodelled in 2015 but 
not much more has appeared on what that means (Tertrais and Guisnel 2016: 243). The order 
would first go to the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff who, since 1996, carries the explicit 
responsibility of “ensuring the execution of the order of engagement given by the president”.15 
This transmission will take place via the Centre opérationnel des forces nucléaires (COFN, 
located in Paris in the îlot Saint Germain and created in 1993). After its validity is verified 
through means that will be explored later, the order will be sent to the nuclear units.   
If the air launched weapons were to be delivered, the COFN would have to authorize the 
Gendarmerie de sécurité des armes nucléaires (GSAN; the branch of the military police, placed 
under the authority of the Minister of Defense, and responsible for the physical safety of the 
warheads. A two-person rule is in force when it comes to the release of weapons (Gregory 1990: 
50; Tertrais 2010:112; Tertrais and Lewis 2019: 17). 
Three networks are meant to guarantee the adequate transmission of the order from the 
President to the officer who will actually launch the weapon : : (1) Jupiter connects the President 
to the Joint Chief of Staff, (2) RAMSES (acronym originally meaning Réseau Amont Maillé 
Stratégique et de Survie or Strategic and Survival Network is the channel through which the 
units would receive their orders, and (3) SYDEREC (acronym for Système de Dernier Recours 
or System of Last Resort) to be used if France has been hit by a massive nuclear strike. 
RAMSES has been in place since 1988 and its latest iteration, RAMSES IV, operational since 
2014 but constantly expanded and to be completed in 2019, is hardened and protected against 
electromagnetic waves (Tertrais and Guisnel 2016: 247, 299) and SYDEREC is said to be based 
on inflatable balloons dispersed on the French territory (Tertrais and Guisnel 2016: 251; 
Tertrais and Lewis 2019: 17). 
If the order must be transmitted to planes, it will be sent to one of the Bases à Vocation 
Nucléaire [Bases with a nuclear purpose]. The pilot and the navigator of the nuclear capable 
aircraft are then expected to sit in a “salle de guerre” [war room] where they would see files 
about their mission. They would then get to the plane with a pod in which they are supposed to 
find the “enveloppes d’engagement” [engagement envelopes] allowing them to authenticate the 
Presidential order. That would mean that the plane takes off with navigation and target 
coordinates. There is a division of labor between the navigator and the pilot, with the former 
unlocking a boitier de contrôle gouvernemental (BCG) [government controlled case] and the 
latter actually firing. The Forces aéronavales nucléaires [Aeronaval nuclear forces or FANU] 
based on the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle only have planes with one pilot on board so the 
protocol is different for them, but only little is known about it. Refueling planes KC-135 are 
also used as intermediaries to communicate with FAS and FANU Rafales (Tertrais and Guisnel 
2016: 248). If the order has to be transmitted to SSBNs, this will be done via one of the centre 
de transmission marine [Navy transmission center] of the Force océanique stratégique [SSBN 
force] (see below for the largest of the four existing centers) through very low frequency waves 
                                                             
15 Decree no. 96-520 of 12 June 1996. 
(VLF). A system of satellite transmission (Syracuse III) can also be used but this requires that 
the SSBN surfaces first (Tertrais and Guisnel 2016: 248-9). 
 
 
Two pictures of the Centre de transmission de la marine at Rosnay (36) in 2018. This site has 
hosted the antennas designed to transmit orders to French SSBNs since the early 1970s16   
                                                             
16 Jean-Michel Bonnin, « La force dissuasive s’immerge en Brenne », La Nouvelle République, 3 March 2018, available 
at https://www.lanouvellerepublique.fr/indre/la-force-dissuasive-s-immerge-en-
brenne?queryId%5Bquery1%5D=57cd2206459a452f008b4594&queryId%5Bquery2%5D=57c95b34479a452f0
08b459d&page=0&pageId=57da5ce5459a4552008b469a.     
Modernization programs of the transmission to the French Air Force (Transaéro) and Navy 
(Transoum) are under way (Tertrais and Guisnel 2016: 248). 
 
Civilian control over the arsenal 
 
The civilian control over French nuclear weapons and the related fissile material is manifested 
at three levels: (1) the custody of warheads and fissile material, (2) positive and negative control 
over warhead release, and (3) control of the implementation of approved plans (Tertrais 2010: 
111). This is incarnated in one particular role, the inspecteur des armements nucléaires (IAN, 
nuclear weapons inspector), a position created under General de Gaulle, which has evolved 
over time. The general officer who now holds it is directly accountable to the Head of State and 
ensures civilian control over French nuclear forces in all three of those aspects (Tertrais 2010: 
111; Tertrais and Guisnel 2016: 173, 179; Gadal 2009: 303; interview with a former head of 
the Forces aériennes stratégiques). The other civilian personality who plays a crucial role in 
the civilian control of nuclear weapons is the Minister of Defence. Former French CEMA 
General François Maurin (1971–75) explained that his responsibilities included the coding of 
hard disks to be mounted on the warheads (Institut Charles de Gaulle 1985: 231; Theleri 1997: 
261). The person in charge of the coding procedure is said to be part of the Minister’s personal 
staff (Tertrais 2010: 112). Analyst and former member of two commissions in charge of writing 
the French white paper on defense and national security Bruno Tertrais claims that, “No weapon 
can physically be detonated without this code. No French nuclear weapon can be physically 
moved without civilian executive authorization, and the president personally approves any 
change in alert status. Unlike their US counterparts, for instance, French SSBN commanders 
have never been able, technically, to launch armed missiles on their own.” (Tertrais 2010: 114)  
 
The military intervenes in that within the Forces aériennes stratégiques, a gendarme has to 
guard the plane and the warhead and to certify to the Minister of Defense the physical reality 
of the alert and the presence of the nuclear core (Gadal 2009: 303; interview with a former head 
of the Forces aériennes stratégiques). However, as I will show in the subsection below, the 
military is not involved in the devolution process in case of incapacitation of elected officials. 
Finally, the 1996 decision to put all French nuclear weapons under the category of strategic 
weapons practically limits the military’s agency in the timing or scale of a nuclear strike the 
way they could have at the time of tactical weapons (Tertrais 2010: 112). 
 
Delegation of nuclear authority vs delegation of war powers in case of incapacitation 
Historically, the institutional arrangement of the nuclear chain of command was made possible 
by the idea that the distinction between war time and peace time no longer applies and that 
national defense has to be “permanent”. This is explicitly stated in the 1959 ordinance.17  
It is important to note, though, the chain of delegation of nuclear authority differs from that of 
delegation of war powers. In the latter, the authority is delegated to the President of the Senate 
if the President is incapacitated, then to the Prime Minister and if the Prime Minister is not able 
to exercise his/her responsibility either, then the Minister of Defense would be next. The official 
list is longer but the published part stops there.18 In nuclear matters, the delegation of authority 
                                                             
17 Ordonnance no. 59-147 of January 7, 1959 on the general organisation of defense, Article 1.  
18 Ordonnance no. 59-147, Article 14. 
is different. The President of the Senate is bypassed and in case of an incapacitated President, 
the authority directly goes to the Prime Minister. (See the testimonies of Michel Rocard, who 
was Prime Minister from 1988 to 1991 in Rocard 1997: 14-15). The Minister of Defense is next 
in case of incapacitation. (Messmer 1992: 320 and Institut Charles de Gaulle 1985: 335). 
Former Defense Minister Messmer stated in his memoirs that beyond those three names, the 
list was secret (Messmer 1992: 320). However, several sources suggest that the fourth name 
would be a civilian authority designated by the President, who reviews and possibly modifies 
the list. (Theleri 1997: 263; Cohen 1994: 79; Tertrais and Guisnel 2016: 253-254). 
 
3. Critical assessment of available information of the French command and control 
practices 
While the previous section presented the French nuclear command and control system from the 
perspective of those who conceived it, and how it should and is expected to work, this section 
confronts those claims to the historical record. It focuses on the following aspects: the problem 
of arbitrariness and possible lack of legitimacy of the person whom the President can designate 
to carry the launch order if all the members of the official chain of command have been 
incapacitated, the crucial role of the military and possibly limited agency of the President in 
situations of crisis, the cases in which protocol has been broken when it comes to carrying the 
launch codes, the cases of accidents involving components of the arsenal carrying nuclear 
weapons and, finally, the aspects about which we have no or contradictory information. 
   
The problem of arbitrariness of the delegation at the bottom of the chain? 
In 2016, a controversy followed the broadcast of a documentary suggesting that an unknown 
person designated by the President could be given the authority to launch nuclear forces. Former 
Defense Minister Paul Quilès (1984–45) and his colleagues from Initiative pour le 
Désarmement Nucléaire [Initiative for nuclear disarmament, IDN]  denounced the absence of 
legitimacy of the person who could be arbitrarily designated by the President to give the order 
to launch French nuclear weapons and kill hundreds of thousands of people if no one in the 
chain of command was able to give it.19 This is odd, however, given this possibility seems as 
old as 1964. On April 24, 1964, then Prime Minister Georges Pompidou explained in an 
ordinary session of the French National Assembly that in case of international crisis, the unique 
nature of nuclear war required to have a “qualified” person able to immediately launch nuclear 
retaliation. This logic in turn led to appointing a person “who may be out of Paris”20 and, as a 
consequence, could not possibly be holding any of the positions in the chain of command 
described above. In sum, this arrangement is not new. The arbitrary choice of the President in 
those matters seems to have been normalized but not discussed with the other members in the 
chain of command. Indeed, the President of the French Senate, Gérard Larcher, was approached 
                                                             
19 Their blog publications can be found here http://paul.quiles.over-blog.com/2016/03/la-dissuasion-c-est-moi-dit-
l-inconnu-de-province.html also published on mediapart at https://blogs.mediapart.fr/paul-
quiles/blog/240316/nucleaire-le-retour-du-docteur-folamour and https://blogs.alternatives-
economiques.fr/collin/2016/03/18/la-bombe-le-president-et-l-inconnu 
20 Georges Pompidou, Journal officiel de la République Française, débats parlementaires. Assemblée Nationale, 
deuxième législature, deuxième session ordinaire de 1963-4, compte rendu intégral de la séance du vendredi 24 
avril 1964, p. 946. 
by IDN and said he was not aware of that procedure and considered it abnormal.21 In that case, 
there is a tension between legitimacy and robustness of the chain of command as the 
arbitrariness of the presidential choice, while being problematic from a legitimacy standpoint, 
decreases the vulnerability associated with the concentration of the decision to retaliate in the 
hands of the President or in a known list of targetable people (Gregory 1990: 58). 
The crucial role of a military authority in the launch order and the agency of the President22 
Contrary to the assumption that the President makes the decision on his own and, as a result, 
possesses the codes which are necessary to authorize it, former Presidents and their private 
chiefs of staff have testified that the President only has one half of the nuclear code and the 
CEMP the other. Then, the CEMA authenticates the Presidential order and passes it on to 
nuclear forces. Similarly, the military aide to the President has been said to carry a copy of the 
presidential code at all times (testimony of Admiral Flohic, who was an aide to de Gaulle, in 
Institut Charles de Gaulle 1985: 336) and, later, under President Mitterrand (1981–96), only a 
portion of the code, given that President’s fear of terrorism (Cohen 1994: 161). Beyond the 
issues of uncertainties related to the suitcase and the code itself (see below), the testimony of 
former President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing makes one question the agency of the President in 
situations of crisis. In the second volume of his memoirs published in 1991, Giscard remembers 
a simulation of massive invasion by Soviet troops moving towards Western Europe that he 
asked his CEMA, Général Méry, to prepare for him, on May 13–14 and 20–21 (Giscard 
d’Estaing 1991: 203-211). In it, the agency of the President is challenged three times.  
First, when General Méry briefs him about the simulation so that the President understands how 
much time he needs to set aside for it, he identifies a phase in the process in which the President 
will simply give his order. When Giscard corrects him and insists that he will be asked whether 
he wants to give his order, the General is clear about the need for the system to anticipate the 
President’s decision to use nuclear weapons.  
Second, in the first phase of the simulation, when the Commander of the French 1st Army asks 
the President for the authorization to use tactical weapons “if he deems it necessary” and 
Giscard decides not to grant it as Soviet troops are not yet in contact with allied units, Méry 
informs him that the Commander did not intend to use his authorization anyway. The President 
explicitly wonders why he was asked, but this story also illustrates a larger degree of agency of 
the commanders in the field than is usually acknowledged.  
Third, in the last phase of the simulation, when the Soviets attack again and the President 
considers we have reached a situation in which the French doctrine of ultime avertissement may 
apply before Soviet troops invade the national territory, the head of the first army shares with 
the President his analysis of the situation and his proposed course of action, which does not 
involve any nuclear option, and does not ask for any authorization. The President does not hide 
his surprise and explicitly asks which authorization he is asked to give. Méry’s answer to this 
question is that he is not asked for any authorization since the commander is not considering a 
nuclear option. Of course, this was only a simulation that involved specific personalities and a 
specific context, which is now outdated. However, the extent to which the President’s agency 
was challenged or bypassed is staggering. The fact that the President himself had confessed his 
                                                             
21 E-mail correspondence with General Bernard Norlain (2S), vice-President of IDN and former head of the 
military cabinet of Prime Ministers Jacques Chirac and Michel Rocard, 12 January 2019. 
22 All unsourced claims in this section come from Tertrais and Guisnel 2016: 235, 247. 
“inexperience” in those matters when he was elected a few pages earlier does not make this any 
less staggering (Giscard 1991: 178).  
Codes that do not get transferred adequately    
The election of a new President is a crucial moment in which nuclear weapons related 
information needs to be transferred. However, it is commonly acknowledged that such transfer 
did not ever take place adequately before 1981. After de Gaulle left office in 1969, three days 
passed before the President of the French Senate Alain Poher, who had become the interim 
President sought to find the information related to French nuclear forces as his CEMP did not 
have it and de Gaulle was unreachable. He did receive the information from Minister of Defense 
Pierre Messmer in an envelope (Tertrais and Guisnel 2016: 238-240). There are conflicting 
accounts about how Poher transferred the code to the incoming President Georges Pompidou 
three weeks later. Five years later, Poher had to receive the codes again after Pompidou passed 
away but he claims that the medallion where the codes were supposed to be was empty. At that 
time, according to General Pierre Caubel, the Forces aériennes stratégiques received a message 
asking them to ignore any order from the presidency as the President was dead and no one knew 
where the code was (cited in Gadal 2009: 335-336). As the story goes, the code was in the 
President’s safe, the pin of which had been modified the previous week. So it took a locksmith 
from French intelligence services to recover it. In 1981, despite conflicting accounts of the 
object President Mitterrand receives from his predecessor, a widely shared anecdote suggests 
that Mitterrand placed the object in his jacket’s pocket… but the jacket was taken to the dry 
cleaner so someone had to be sent to pick it up immediately. At least for some time, the amount 
of which is disputed, the President was unable to give the order to engage nuclear weapons 
forces.23    
Accidents and close calls 
Command and control practices also assume that the delivery vehicles can accomplish the 
mission, that the planes in charge of the nuclear mission do not crash and that the submarines 
do not collide with other submarines. However, those two types of situations did happen.  
The accidents we review in this section do not directly involve nuclear weapons but their 
delivery vehicle, in the last thirty years.24 Mirage 2000N, which carries this initial because it is 
nuclear capable, among other types of mission, has been involved in at least 15 serious 
accidents. This includes two incidents during air refueling leading to the ejection of the pilots, 
eight collisions with birds or motorized ultralights as this plane was designed to fly at a very 
low altitude and three recent mechanical incidents: an engine problem in 1996, a fuel pump 
problem in 1998 and a fuel flow problem in 2008.25 In September 2017, another Mirage 2000N 
crashed in N’Djamena, Chad, during takeoff.26 
                                                             
23 Jacques Séguéla, « La clé atomique » [‘The Atomic Key’], Le Nouvel Observateur, 5–11 January 2006;, Victoria 
Gairin, « Derrière les murs du Château » [‘Behind the Walls of the Castle’], Le Point, 29 March, 2012. 
24 For earlier accidents on Mirage IV, see Galan 2014: 71-75; 103-110.  
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26 Jean-Dominique Merchet, « Un mirage 2000N s’écrase à N’Djaména », blog Secret Défense, 21 september 
2017, available at  https://www.lopinion.fr/blog/secret-defense/mirage-2000n-s-ecrase-a-n-djamena-134946  
Beyond those incidents, a story suggests that a pilot of the Forces aériennes stratégiques took 
off with nuclear weapons under his wings thinking he had received an order to go when actually 
that was not the case. This apparently took place in 1966 on the Air base of Orange and due to 
a short circuit on a screen which produced an erroneous message of “décollage de guerre” (war-
time take-off). The pilot took off and the first requests to return to base he received were not 
according to protocol so he declined to answer them. As he was waiting for the confirmation of 
the engagement order, he ran out of fuel and had to go back. (Tertrais and Guisnel 2016: 23527) 
As expected, the story is told as evidence that the process is robust because the plane was 
effectively recalled. But former FAS pilot Robert Galan insists that the landing back was indeed 
very dangerous because of the sensitivity of this first generation of bombs (Galan 2014: 69). 
Most interestingly, the Private chief of Staff of General de Gaulle, admiral Philippon, admitted 
in his memoir that he never reported this accident to the President and assumes that it is the one 
which would have been assessed as the most serious of all.28 
During the night of 3-4 February 2009, France’s SSBN Le Triomphant collided with a UK 
SSBN, HMS Vanguard, in the Atlantic Ocean.29 What is known about the incident is the 
outcome of a UK Freedom of Information (FOI) request from 27 February 2009, investigative 
journalism, and statements from government officials. According to the UK government’s 
account of the incident, obtained through the FOI request, “Two submerged SSBNs, one French 
and the other UK, were conducting routine national patrols in the Atlantic Ocean. The two 
submarines came into contact at very low speed. Both submarines remained safe and no injuries 
occurred.” The statement added that “[a]t no time was nuclear safety compromised and the 
Strategic Weapon System remained inside tolerable limits at all times.’ The French first official 
statement, on Febuary 6, that Le Triomphant, equipped with 16 ballistic missiles, ‘collided with 
an immersed object (probably a container).”30 The French government later acknowledged that 
the collision had involved another nuclear-armed submarine.  
The first account of the 2009 collision, alongside Admiral Philippon’s testimony above, 
reminds us that our knowledge of technological failures, accidents, and incidents is most 
certainly an underestimation of the record due to mistakes and institutional and professional 
interests in covering them up.31  
What we do not know 
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Beyond the problems of arbitrariness, mismanagement, and incidents and accidents outlined 
above, there are key components of the French nuclear command and control system about 
which we either do not know much or have partial and conflicting accounts.  
For instance, we do not know the scope or number of presidential nuclear options and the details 
of command and control procedures on board French SSBNs. On the former matter, the 
assumption is that there is more than one available nuclear option, which is why one of the 
missions of the command and control system is to adequately transmit the order about the type 
of engagement required from the nuclear forces (Tertrais and Guisnel 2016: 234). We do not 
know either how the chain of command would operate on board an SSBN in crisis situation 
(Tertrais and Guisnel 2016: 254).  
The April 1961 nuclear situation in Algeria is now considered to have not been dangerous, but 
this deserves further investigation. (The most recent and synthetic work is Tertrais 2013.) On 
April 21, 1961, as a result of a referendum on the self-determination of Algeria, four generals 
organized a coup and took over the city of Algiers. At that time, the French nuclear test site was 
in the region of Reggane, in Algeria. While classic US accounts of the nuclear situation in 
French Algeria at the time of the putsch des généraux [military coup] have long suggested that 
French authorities decided to detonate the device that was there at the time for fear that the 
insurgents might capture it. A more recent account based on discussions with French 
intelligence officials led the analyst to dismiss the case entirely as a relevant precedent to think 
about nuclear terrorism. Most recently, and predictably given the three challenges identified in 
the introduction of this essay, Bruno Tertrais concluded that “the device was never at risk of 
being controlled by the rebels” (2013: 44) and that the coup was mostly independent from any 
nuclear considerations. In his view, this is the case because (1) contrary to original accounts, 
the device was not in the base controlled by the rebels, (2) he found no evidence of willingness 
to seize the device on the part of the units around it, (3) the rebels had no way of knowing 
whether the components of the device were stored at the based or had already reached the testing 
ground, (4) the timing of the test in the early morning is the usual time, and (5) detonating it 
would have been extremely challenging anyway because the assembling process was partly 
automated and the device was not meant to be moved and detonated at will. However, even he 
acknowledges that security at the base was limited to one platoon of gendarmes and a company 
of soldiers, with another one some fifty kilometers away, and that the security culture was lax, 
given how remote the base was. Moreover, his study is only based on secondary sources which 
were not originally focused on the nuclear dimension of the coup and a few interviews. Archival 
investigations may reveal dangers that have not yet surfaced. 
Conflicting versions of the content of the French “nuclear suitcase” are also available. Colonel 
Peer de Jong, military aide in charge of carrying it between 1994 and 1997, treats it as mostly 
symbolic and empty of the crucial “object” that is supposed to be used to authenticate the order. 
Speaking with journalists in 2015, he considers that having a critical piece of technology in the 
suitcase would actually make the system more fragile and that keeping the crucial object in it 
would be risky too. However, General Henri Bentégeat, CEMP between 1999 and 2002, 
contradicts this version and asserted in 2013 that the football included “a coding machine and 
other complex and secret systems.” But three years later, he confessed that he himself never 
looked into the football carried by the military aide (cited in Tertrais and Guisnel 2016: 237, 
244; my translation). Those conflicting accounts suggest that, in the end, we do not know either 
about the command and control procedure on board French SSBNs or the exact content of the 
French nuclear suitcase, which would be crucial if a nuclear crisis takes place at a time when 
the President is away from the Elysée Palace and has to react before getting back to the Jupiter 
command post. 
A final area to be investigated, which may reveal practices which differed from what is 
expected, has to do with the health of leaders. While we know that Kennedy’s heavy 
medication may have clouded his judgment at key moments of nuclear diplomacy,32 the 
implications of French Presidents’ declining health and heavy pain related to it on nuclear 
command and control has not yet been properly investigated.33 One has to remember that 
Georges Pompidou died in office and that François Mitterrand suffered from prostatic cancer 
and kept it secret from the public for eleven years while he was the President of France.34 
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